


EASA	EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE	
	<p style="text-align: center;">EAD No : 2007-0234-E</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Date: 29 August 2007</p>	
No person may operate an aircraft to which an Airworthiness Directive applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that Airworthiness Directive unless otherwise agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry.		
Type Approval Holder's Name :	Type/Model designation(s) :	
The Boeing Company	737 series aircraft	
TCDS Number: FAA (USA) Nr. A16WE		
Foreign AD: FAA Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) 2007-18-52, issued 28 August 2007		
Supersedure: For aircraft operated under EU regulations, the requirements of this EAD take precedence over those contained in FAA EAD 2007-18-52.		
ATA 57	Wings – Slat Track Downstop Assembly & Parts – Inspection / Repair / Replacement	
Manufacturer(s):	Boeing Airplane Company	
Applicability:	<p>Model 737-600, 737-700, 737-700C, 737-800 and 737-900 series aircraft, all serial numbers.</p> <p>Note: The FAA EAD applies also to Model 737-900ER aircraft; as this Model has not been validated in Europe at this time, no aircraft operated under EU regulations and/or registered in EU Member States are affected. For that reason, this EAD cannot be applied to those aircraft.</p>	
Reason:	<p>EASA has received reports of parts of the main slat track downstop assembly coming off the main slat track. In one case, a nut fell into the slat track housing (referred to as "slat can") and, during a subsequent slat retraction, the track made contact with the nut, pushing it into the wall of the can and puncturing it. That operator reported finding fuel leaking from the drain hole in the slat track housing at the No. 5 slat track position. In another case, an initial investigation revealed that following retraction of the slats after landing on a Model 737-800 airplane, loose parts of the main slat track downstop assembly punctured the slat can, which resulted in a fuel leak and a fire that ultimately destroyed the airplane.</p> <p>Loose or missing parts from the main slat track downstop assemblies, if not detected and corrected, could result in a fuel leak and consequent fire.</p> <p>To address and correct the unsafe condition described above, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the responsible authority of the State of Design for the</p>	

	<p>affected type design, has issued Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) 2007-18-51 on 25 August 2007. This was subsequently superseded by EAD 2007-18-52 on 28 August 2007. That EAD requires, within 10 days after receipt of that document by the owner or operator of an affected aircraft, repetitive detailed or borescope inspections of the slat track downstop assembly to verify that proper hardware is installed and corrective actions, if necessary. Corrective actions include installing a new or serviceable part; and doing a detailed inspection of the inside of the slat can for foreign object debris (FOD) and damage, and removing any FOD and repairing damage that is found. For aircraft on which no discrepancies are found, that EAD requires, within 24 days after receipt, a one-time torquing of the nut and bolt.</p> <p>This EASA EAD requires those same actions, but establishes a date for these required actions to become effective for all aircraft operated under EU regulations, and requires the initial inspection and corrective actions, if necessary, to be accomplished within the next 10 days after that date. The one-time torquing of the nut and bolt, as applicable, is required within 20 days of that same date. In all other aspects, this EAD contains the same requirements as FAA EAD 2007-18-52, which is attached to this directive.</p>
Effective Date:	29 August 2007
Compliance:	<p>(a) Within the next 10 days after the effective date of this directive, accomplish the tasks described in paragraph (f) of FAA EAD 2007-18-52 (attached to this EASA EAD);</p> <p>(b) Within the next 20 days after the effective date of this directive, accomplish the tasks described in paragraph (g) of FAA EAD 2007-18-52.</p> <p>All other aspects and requirements of FAA EAD 2007-18-52 remain unchanged and can be considered as 'adopted' in accordance with EASA ED Decision 2/2003.</p>
Ref. Publications:	<p>Boeing Service Letter 737-SL-57-084-B, dated 10 July 2007;</p> <p>Boeing Correspondence (Multi-Operator Message) Service Request ID 1-523812011-1, issued 25 August 2007; and</p> <p>Boeing Correspondence (Multi-Operator Message) Service Request ID 1-527463441-1, issued 28 August 2007.</p>
Remarks :	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can accept Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD. 2. The safety assessment has requested not to implement the full consultation process and an immediate publication and notification. 3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the AD Focal Point - Certification Directorate, EASA. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu . 4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this AD, please contact: The Boeing Company, Fleet Support Engineering P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207, United States of America; Telephone +1-425-237 0300; Facsimile +1-425-237 0352; E-mail bruce.a.dickinson@boeing.com; Website http://www.myboeingfleet.com.

EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE



Aircraft Certification Service
Washington, DC

U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

We post Emergency ADs on the internet at "www.faa.gov"

ISSUE DATE: August 28, 2007

AD 2007-18-52; FAA-2007-29089; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-215-AD

Emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2007-18-52 is sent to all owners and operators of Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes.

Background

On August 25, 2007, the FAA issued emergency AD 2007-18-51 for Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. That AD requires repetitive detailed inspections of the main slat track downstop assemblies to verify that proper hardware is installed, one-time torquing of the nut and bolt, and corrective actions if necessary. Corrective actions include installing a new or serviceable part; and doing a detailed inspection of the inside of the slat can for foreign object debris (FOD) and damage, and removing any FOD and repairing damage that is found.

That AD resulted from reports of parts of the main slat track downstop assembly coming off the main slat track. In one case, a nut fell into the slat track housing (referred to as "slat can") and, during a subsequent slat retraction, the track made contact with the nut, pushing it into the wall of the can and puncturing it. That operator reported finding fuel leaking from the drain hole in the slat track housing at the No. 5 slat track position. In another case, an initial investigation revealed that following retraction of the slats after landing on a Model 737-800 airplane, loose parts of the main slat track downstop assembly punctured the slat can, which resulted in a fuel leak and a fire that ultimately destroyed the airplane. We issued that AD to detect and correct loose or missing parts from the main slat track downstop assemblies, which could result in a fuel leak and consequent fire.

Actions Since Issuance of Previous AD

Since the issuance of emergency AD 2007-18-51, we have received additional reports of parts coming off the main slat track downstop assemblies. In these cases, the parts were found in the bottom of the slat track housing ("slat can"). Additionally, in one case, the slat can was damaged.

Based on this new information, we find that the 24-day compliance time specified in AD 2007-18-51 for accomplishing the detailed inspection of each main slat track downstop assembly to verify proper installation of the slat track hardware is not adequate to address the unsafe condition. We have determined that the appropriate compliance time for this inspection is 10 days after receipt of this new AD. In addition, we have determined that an inspection using borescope techniques in lieu of a detailed inspection is acceptable.

Further, we have determined that by performing the initial detailed or borescope inspection within the reduced compliance time of 10 days, the compliance time for torquing the nut and bolt can remain at 24 days after receipt of AD 2007-18-51.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Rule

We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of this same type design. Therefore, we are issuing this AD to detect and correct loose or missing parts from the main slat track downstop assemblies and dented slat cans, which could result in a fuel leak and consequent fire. This new AD supersedes AD 2007-18-51. This new AD requires the same actions as AD 2007-18-51, but reduces the compliance time for the initial detailed inspection of each main slat track downstop assembly to verify proper installation of the slat track hardware from 24 days after receipt of AD 2007-18-51 to 10 days after receipt of this new AD. This new AD also provides an additional inspection method (using borescope techniques) in lieu of the detailed inspection.

Clarification of Determining Proper Installation of Hardware

Operators should note that it was not our intent that the hardware for the main slat track downstop assemblies be disassembled to determine proper installation of the sleeve. Proper installation of the sleeve need not be confirmed, and the stop location part may be installed on either the inboard or the outboard side of the slat track. Disassembling the parts provides additional opportunities for introducing the unsafe condition addressed in this AD. Therefore, we have revised paragraph (f) of this AD accordingly.

Clarification of Reference to Boeing Multi Operator Message

Paragraph (f)(1) of AD 2007-18-51 identified "Boeing Correspondence (Multi-Operator Message) Service Request ID 1-523812011, issued August 25, 2007," as one approved method for verifying proper installation; installing a new or serviceable part; and inspecting for damage and FOD, and removing FOD and repairing damage. This AD identifies that document correctly as "Boeing Multi Operator Message Number 1-523812011-1, issued August 25, 2007."

Since the issuance of AD 2007-18-51, Boeing has issued Boeing Multi Operator Message Number 1-527463441-1, issued August 28, 2007. We have referenced that document in this AD as an additional approved method for doing the specified actions.

Interim Action

We consider this AD interim action. If final action is later identified, we might consider further rulemaking then.

Examining the Docket

You may examine the contents of this AD docket on the Internet at <http://dms.dot.gov> (on the next business day after we have issued the AD), or in person at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. The docket number for this docket is FAA-2007-29089; the directorate identifier for this docket is 2007-NM-215-AD.

Authority for this Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, "General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Determination of Rule's Effective Date

This AD is issued under 49 U.S.C. Section 44701 according to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, and is effective immediately upon receipt.

2007-18-52 BOEING: Docket No. FAA-2007-29089; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-215-AD.

Effective Date

(a) Emergency AD 2007-18-52, issued on August 28, 2007, is effective immediately upon receipt.

Affected ADs

(b) This AD supersedes AD 2007-18-51.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to all Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes, certificated in any category.

Unsafe Condition

(d) This AD results from additional reports of parts coming off the main slat track downstop assemblies. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct loose or missing parts from the main slat track downstop assemblies, which could result in a fuel leak and consequent fire.

Compliance

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

Note 1: Paragraph (f) of this AD merely restates the requirements of paragraph (f)(1) of AD 2007-18-51. As allowed by the phrase, "unless the actions have already been done," if the applicable initial inspections required by paragraph (f)(1) of AD 2007-18-51 have already been done, this AD does not require that those inspections be repeated until the repetitive interval of 3,000 flight cycles.

Repetitive Detailed Inspections: New Initial Compliance Time



(f) Within 10 days after receipt of this AD: Do a detailed inspection or a borescope inspection of each main slat track downstop assembly to verify proper installation of the slat track hardware (i.e., the bolt, washers, downstops, stop location, and nut shown in Figure 1 of Boeing Service Letter 737-SL-57-084-B, dated July 10, 2007, and in this AD). Proper installation of the sleeve need not be confirmed, and the stop location part may be installed on either the inboard or the outboard side of the slat track. If any part is missing or is installed improperly, before further flight, install a new or serviceable part using a method approved in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (h) of this AD; and do a detailed inspection of the inside of the slat can for foreign object debris (FOD) and damage. Before further flight, remove any FOD found and repair any damage found using a method approved in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (h) of this AD. Using Boeing Multi Operator Message Number 1-523812011-1, issued August 25, 2007; or 1-527463441-1, issued August 28, 2007; is one approved method for verifying proper installation; installing a new or serviceable part; and inspecting for damage and FOD, and removing FOD and repairing damage. Repeat the actions required by paragraph (f) of this AD thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight cycles.

Note 2: Paragraph (g) of this AD merely restates the requirements of paragraph (f)(2) of AD 2007-18-51. As allowed by the phrase, “unless the actions have already been done,” if the torque application required by paragraph (f)(2) of AD 2007-18-51 has already been done, this AD does not require that the torque application be repeated.

One-Time Torquing

(g) Within 24 days after receipt of AD 2007-18-51: Apply a torque between 50 to 80 inch-pounds to the nut. The bolt head must be held with the torque applied to the nut.

Note 3: For the purposes of this AD, a detailed inspection is: “An intensive examination of a specific item, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate. Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be necessary. Surface cleaning and elaborate procedures may be required.”



Slat Track Downstop Assembly

Figure 1

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(h)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used for any repair required by this AD, if it is approved by an Authorized Representative for the Boeing Commercial Airplanes Delegation Option Authorization Organization who has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to make those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair must meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must specifically refer to this AD.

(4) AMOCs approved previously in accordance with AD 2007-18-51, are approved as AMOCs for the corresponding provisions of this AD.

Contact Information

For technical information about this AD, contact: Nancy Marsh, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6440; fax (425) 917-6590.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 28, 2007.

Original signed by:
Stephen P. Boyd,
Acting Manager,
Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.