



## Airworthiness Directive

**AD No.:** 2018-0058R1

**Issued:** 08 February 2019

Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 on behalf of the European Union, its Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 129 of that Regulation.

This AD is issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 748/2012, Part 21.A.3B. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the Agency [Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Article 71 exemption].

### Design Approval Holder's Name:

AIRBUS

### Type/Model designation(s):

A350 aeroplanes

**Effective Date:** Revision 1: 15 February 2019  
Original issue: 16 March 2018

**TCDS Number(s):** EASA.A.151

**Foreign AD:** Not applicable

**Revision:** This AD revises EASA AD 2018-0058 dated 14 March 2018.

## ATA 27 – Flight Controls – Station Position Pick-Off Unit – Calibration Procedure

### Manufacturer(s):

Airbus

### Applicability:

Airbus A350-941 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

### Definitions:

For the purpose of this AD, the following definitions apply:

**The SB:** Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) A350-27-P021.

**Aeroplane date of manufacture:** The date of transfer of title (ownership) which is referenced in Airbus documentation at the time of first delivery to an operator.

### Reason:

Occurrences have been reported by Airbus A350 operators of malfunctions of Station Position Pick-Off Units (SPPU). Investigations indicated that internal wiring failures occurred due to water ingress via certain electrical connectors, inducing subsequent icing during flight.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to hidden sensor signal drift (at flap station 3) which, in combination with an independent failure of a flap down drive disconnect, might lead to



in-flight detachment of the outer flap surface, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane, and/or injury to persons on the ground.

Airbus determined that the SPPU calibration test can highlight all hidden faults, but this test is only scheduled after removal/installation of the equipment. Consequently, to address this potential unsafe condition, Airbus issued the SB, providing instructions to accomplish the SPPU calibration test at regular intervals.

For the reason described above, this AD requires repetitive SPPU calibration tests and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s).

Pending the results of the on-going investigation, this AD is considered to be an interim measure and further AD action may follow.

Prompted by operator comments, this AD is revised to correct the compliance times of paragraph (1).

#### **Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):**

Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:

#### **Repetitive SPPU calibration test:**

- (1) Within 200 flight cycles (FC) after the effective date of this AD, or within 200 FC after the aeroplane date of manufacture, whichever occurs later, and, thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 200 FC, accomplish an SPPU calibration test in accordance with the instructions of the SB.

#### **Corrective Action(s):**

- (2) If, during any test as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, discrepancies are detected, before next flight, accomplish the applicable corrective action(s) in accordance with the instructions of the SB.

#### **Terminating Action:**

- (3) None.

#### **Ref. Publications:**

Airbus SB A350-27-P021 original issue dated 13 February 2018.

The use of later approved revisions of the above-mentioned document is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.

#### **Remarks:**

1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD.
2. Based on the required actions and the compliance time, EASA have decided to issue a Final AD with Request for Comments, postponing the public consultation process until after publication.



3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the EASA Safety Information Section, Certification Directorate. E-mail: [ADs@easa.europa.eu](mailto:ADs@easa.europa.eu).
4. Information about any failures, malfunctions, defects or other occurrences, which may be similar to the unsafe condition addressed by this AD, and which may occur, or have occurred on a product, part or appliance not affected by this AD, can be reported to the [EU aviation safety reporting system](#).
5. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this AD, please contact AIRBUS XWB – E-mail: [continued-airworthiness.a350@airbus.com](mailto:continued-airworthiness.a350@airbus.com).

REVISSED

