

Airworthiness Directive

AD No.: 2018-0081

Issued: 11 April 2018

Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation (EC) 216/2008 on behalf of the European Union, its Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 66 of that Regulation.

This AD is issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 748/2012, Part 21.A.3B. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the Agency [Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [Regulation (EC) 216/2008, Article 14(4) exemption].

Design Approval Holder's Name: Type/Model designation(s):

ALLSTAR PZL GLIDER Sp. z o.o. SZD-55-1 sailplanes

Effective Date: 25 April 2018

TCDS Number(s): Poland BG-163/1

Foreign AD: Not applicable

Supersedure: None

ATA 27 - Flight Controls - Elevator Control System / Vertical Tail - Inspection

Manufacturer(s):

Allstar PZL Glider Sp. z o. o., formerly PDPSz "PZL Bielsko"

Applicability:

SZD-55-1 sailplanes, all serial numbers.

Reason:

Following a fatal accident with an SZD-55-1 sailplane, it was found that, during rigging, the elevator lever had not been connected with the guide of the control system. The investigation results also revealed that the opening on top of the vertical tail, through which the elevator control lever is inserted, had been enlarged. The correct dimension of the opening ensures safe rigging and is explicitly defined in the design (see Drawing 1, Appendix 1 of this AD) of the horizontal tail (1), where the connection is such that if the elevator lever (7) is not correctly located inside the guide (8), the tail cannot be secured with bolt (5).

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to further cases of mis-rigging of the elevator control system, possibly resulting in loss of control of the sailplane.

For the reason described above, this AD requires a one-time inspection of the elevator control system and vertical tail and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s) to establish conformity with the type design.



Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):

Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:

Inspection(s):

(1) Within 60 days, or during the next annual inspection, whichever occurs first after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the size of the opening on top of the vertical tail (see Drawing 2, Appendix 1 of this AD).

Corrective Action(s):

(2) If, during the inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, discrepancies are detected, before next flight, contact Allstar PZL Glider for approved repair instructions and accomplish those instructions accordingly.

Ref. Publications:


Air Accidents Investigation Branch of the United Kingdom (AAIB) Bulletin 3/2018.

Remarks:


- 1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD.
- 2. This AD was posted on 15 March 2018 as PAD 18-038 for consultation until 05 April 2018. No comments were received during the consultation period.
- 3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the EASA Safety Information Section, Certification Directorate. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu.
- 4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this AD please contact: Allstar PZL Glider Sp. z o.o., ul. Cieszyńska 325, 43-300 Bielsko-Biała, Fax: +48 33 812 37 39, E-mail: techsupport@szd.com.pl.



Appendix 1 – Drawings and photographs



Drawing 1



[Drawings courtesy of Allstar PZL Gliders Sp. z o.o.]





Image 1
Disconnected elevator control



Image 2
Disconnected elevator control



Image 3
Disconnected elevator control



Image 4
Enlarged opening

[All photographs courtesy Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) of the United Kingdom.]