

Airworthiness Directive

AD No.: 2020-0249

Issued: 11 November 2020

Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 on behalf of the European Union, its Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 129 of that Regulation.

This AD is issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 748/2012, Part 21.A.3B. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the Agency [Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Article 71 exemption].

Design Approval Holder's Name:

ATR-GIE AVIONS DE TRANSPORT REGIONAL

Type/Model designation(s):

ATR 42 and ATR 72 aeroplanes

Effective Date: 25 November 2020

TCDS Number(s): EASA.A.084

Foreign AD: Not applicable

Supersedure: None

ATA 31 – Instruments – Angle of Attack Probe and Multi-Function Computers Electrical Routing – Operational Test / Inspection

Manufacturer(s):

ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Régional, formerly EADS ATR - Alenia, Aerospatiale Matra ATR - ALENIA, Aerospatiale - Alenia, Aerospatiale - Aeritalia

Applicability:

ATR 42-400 and ATR 42-500 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN); and

ATR 72-101, ATR 72-102, ATR 72-201, ATR 72-202, ATR 72-211, ATR 72-212 and ATR 72-212A aeroplanes, all MSN.

Definitions:

For the purpose of this AD, the following definitions apply:

The AOM: ATR Airworthiness Operators Message (AOM) 2020/14 Issue 1.

Affected wiring: Electrical wire routing between left-hand and right-hand side Angle of Attack (AOA) probes and Multi-Function Computers (MFC).

Reason:

The results of tests performed on an aeroplane on the ATR final assembly line showed that damage on a wire bundle between an AOA probe and an MFC can inhibit the activation of the stick pusher without any indication to the flight crew.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could possibly result in loss of control of the aeroplane.

To address this potential unsafe condition, ATR issued the AOM to provide instructions for operational testing and inspection of the affected wiring.

For the reason described above, this AD requires repetitive operational testing of the stall warning system and a one-time visual inspection of the affected wiring, and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s). This AD also requires reporting of the inspection results to ATR.

Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):

Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:

Repetitive Operational Test:

- (1) Within 2 months after the effective date of this AD, and, thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 500 flight hours (FH), accomplish an operational test of the stall warning system and the stick pusher in the flight configuration in accordance with the instructions of the AOM.

Inspection:

- (2) Within 750 FH or 5 months, whichever occurs first after the effective date of this AD, accomplish a visual inspection of the affected wiring in accordance with the instructions of the AOM.

Corrective Action(s):

- (3) If, during the first operational test as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, or during the inspection as required by paragraph (2) of this AD, any discrepancies are detected, before next flight, contact ATR for approved instructions and accomplish those instructions accordingly.

Reporting:

- (4) Within 30 days after the inspection as required by paragraph (2) of this AD, report the results (including no findings) to ATR. This can be accomplished in accordance with the instructions of the AOM.

Ref. Publications:

ATR AOM 2020/14 Issue 1 dated 05 November 2020.

The use of later approved revisions of the above-mentioned document is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.



Remarks:

1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD.
2. Based on the required actions and the compliance time, EASA have decided to issue a Final AD with Request for Comments, postponing the public consultation process until after publication.
3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the EASA Programming and Continued Airworthiness Information Section, Certification Directorate. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu.
4. Information about any failures, malfunctions, defects or other occurrences, which may be similar to the unsafe condition addressed by this AD, and which may occur, or have occurred on a product, part or appliance not affected by this AD, can be reported to the [EU aviation safety reporting system](#). This may include reporting on the same or similar components, other than those covered by the design to which this AD applies, if the same unsafe condition can exist or may develop on an aircraft with those components installed. Such components may be installed under an FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) or other modification.
5. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this AD, please contact: ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Régional, Continued Airworthiness Service, Telephone: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21, Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18; E-mail: continued.airworthiness@atr-aircraft.com.

REVISIONS

