

Airworthiness Directive

AD No.: 2022-0168R2

Issued: 28 October 2025

Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 on behalf of the European Union, its Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 129 of that Regulation.

This AD is issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 748/2012, Part 21.A.3B. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I Part M.A.301, or Annex Vb Part ML.A.301, as applicable, the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the Agency [Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I Part M.A.303, or Annex Vb Part ML.A.303, as applicable] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Article 71 exemption].

Design Approval Holder's Name:

AIRBUS HELICOPTERS DEUTSCHLAND GmbH

Type/Model designation(s):

EC135, EC635 and MBB-BK117 helicopters

Effective Date: Revision 2: 11 November 2025
 Revision 1: 26 September 2025
 Original Issue: 26 August 2022

TCDS Number(s): EASA.R.009 and EASA.R.010

Foreign AD: Not applicable

Revision: This AD revises EASA AD 2022-0168R1 dated 12 September 2025, which previously superseded EASA AD 2022-0143 dated 08 July 2022.

ATA – Rotorcraft Flight Manual – Section Emergency Procedures – Amendment ATA 42 – Integrated Modular Avionics – Ethernet Network – Inspection

Manufacturer(s):

Airbus Helicopters Deutschland (AHD) GmbH, formerly Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH; Eurocopter España S.A.; Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd.

Applicability:

AHD EC135 P3H, EC135 T3H, EC635 P3H and EC635 T3H helicopters, all serial numbers (s/n);

AHD MBB-BK117 D-2, MBB-BK117 D-3 and MBB-BK117 D-3m helicopters, all variants, all s/n.

Definitions:

For the purpose of this AD, the following definitions apply:

The ASB: AH Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) EC135H-05A-001, ASB MBB-BK117 D-2-05A-003 and ASB MBB-BK117 D-3-05A-001, as applicable.

Maintenance mode test procedure: In accordance with the instructions of section 3.B.1 of the ASB (EC135 and MBB-BK117 helicopters).

Operational mode test procedure: In accordance with the instructions of section 3.B.3 of the ASB (EC135 and MBB-BK117 helicopters).

Troubleshooting instructions: In accordance with the instructions of sections 3.B.2 and 3.B.4 of the ASB (EC135 and MBB-BK117 helicopters).

Operational limitation: Prohibition to operate a helicopter in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) and Night Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC); and installation of a placard in the cockpit in accordance with the instructions of the ASB.

The RFM Emergency Procedure: Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) emergency procedure as identified in Appendix 1 of this AD, as applicable.

Reason:

Occurrences were reported of multiple Multi-Function Display (MFD) failures. Investigations identified design deficiencies in the Ethernet network management of the Integrated Modular Avionics suite (IMA), which caused MFD failures after damage to an Ethernet wiring connector and/or an avionics equipment.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to reduced situational awareness of the pilot, possibly resulting in reduced control of the helicopter.

Due to similarity of design, several types may be affected by similar failures. To address this potential unsafe condition, AH issued the ASB, as defined in this AD, providing instructions for inspections, and EASA issued AD 2022-0143 to require repetitive checks of the functional status of the IMA Ethernet network and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s), which may include an operational limitation.

After that AD was issued, AH developed the RFM Emergency Procedure, as defined in this AD, providing procedures to be applied in case of loss of all MFD. AH also issued, for the affected helicopters, updated RFMs and Temporary Revision of the RFM, including the RFM Emergency Procedure. Consequently, EASA issued AD 2022-0168, retaining the requirements of EASA AD 2022-0143, which was superseded, and additionally requiring incorporation of the RFM Emergency Procedure into the applicable RFM.

Since that AD was issued, AH has developed a design change for EC 175 B helicopters, solving the previously identified deficiencies in the design for this helicopter type, and issued ASB EC175-46-40-0006, requiring modification of the aircraft management computer (AMC) and the MFDs, and ASB EC175-05-00-0003, to introduce a recurring check of the Ethernet connection of equipment with the MFDs to limit the risk of a multiple MFD failure in flight. Accordingly, EASA AD 2025-0196 was issued taking over the requirements of AD 2022-0168 for EC 175 B helicopters, and AD 2022-0168 was revised to remove EC 175 B helicopters from its Applicability, including deletion of all references to EC 175 B related documents.



Since AD 2022-0168R1 was issued, AH developed modifications for H160-B helicopters to address the previously identified deficiencies in the design of the Helionix avionics suite, and issued ASB H160-46-20-0002 and ASB H160-46-31-0004. These ASBs provide instructions to install HELIONIX V11 and for modification of the software of the Helionix AMCs and MFDs.

For the reasons described above, EASA AD 2025-0242 is issued taking over the requirements for H160-B helicopters, and this AD is revised to remove H160-B helicopters from its Applicability and to delete all references to H160-B related documents.

For the other (remaining) helicopter types, this revised AD is still considered to be an interim action and further AD action may follow.

Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):

Required as indicated by this AD, unless the action(s) required by this AD have been already accomplished:

Inspection(s):

- (1) Within 55 flight hours (FH) after 15 July 2022 [the effective date of EASA AD 2022-0143], and, thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 110 FH, accomplish a check in accordance with the maintenance mode test procedure, and in accordance with the operational mode test procedure, as defined in this AD.

Corrective Action(s):

- (2) If, during any check as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, any discrepancy, as identified in the ASB, is detected, before next flight, accomplish the applicable corrective action(s) in accordance with the troubleshooting instructions, as defined in this AD.

Additional Maintenance Requirements:

- (3) From 15 July 2022 [the effective date of EASA AD 2022-0143], following accomplishment of any maintenance task on a helicopter that includes disconnection and subsequent re-connection of any connector of the IMA Ethernet network, or following any MFD failure, before next flight, accomplish a check in accordance with the maintenance mode test procedure, and in accordance with the operational mode test procedure, and, depending on findings, accomplish the applicable corrective action(s) in accordance with the troubleshooting instructions.

Operational Limitation:

- (4) If, after accomplishment of troubleshooting instructions as required by paragraph (2) or (3) of this AD, as applicable, any discrepancy cannot be removed or corrected, before next flight, implement the operational limitation, as defined in this AD, inform all flight crews and, thereafter, operate the helicopter accordingly.

Alternative Method:

- (5) Implementing the operational limitation on a helicopter as specified in paragraph (4) of this AD is an acceptable alternative method to defer compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this AD for that helicopter. Following accomplishment of the checks and corrective action(s), as applicable, as required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this AD, the



operational limitation can be removed, provided any discrepancy has been removed or corrected, as applicable.

Terminating Action(s):

(6) None.

RFM Amendment:

- (7) Within 7 days after 26 August 2022 [the effective date of the original issue of this AD], amend the applicable RFM by incorporating the RFM Emergency Procedure, as defined in this AD, inform all flight crews and, thereafter, operate the helicopter accordingly.
- (8) Amending the applicable RFM of a helicopter by incorporating the RFM revision as listed in Table 1 of this AD, as applicable, or a later RFM revision which includes the same content as the RFM Emergency Procedure, is an acceptable method to comply with the requirements of paragraph (7) of this AD for that helicopter.

Table 1 – RFM Revisions

| Helicopter Type/Model | RFM Revision |
|-----------------------|---|
| EC135 P3H | EC135 P3H Flight Manual, Effectivity: HLX Step 2+, Rev. 19.4 EC135 P3H Flight Manual, Effectivity: HLX Step 3.1, Rev. 19.4 EC135 P3H Flight Manual Supplement 9.1-4 Effectivity: HLX Step 3.1, Rev. 1.1 |
| EC135 T3H | EC135 T3H Flight Manual, Effectivity: HLX Step 2+, Rev. 20.2 EC135 T3H Flight Manual, Effectivity: HLX Step 3.1, Rev. 20.2 EC135 T3H Flight Manual Supplement 9.1-4 Effectivity: HLX Step 3.1, Rev. 1.1 |
| EC635 P3H | EC635 P3H Flight Manual, Effectivity: HLX Step 2+, Rev. 19.4 EC635 P3H Flight Manual, Effectivity: HLX Step 3.1, Rev. 19.4 EC635 P3H Flight Manual Supplement 9.1-4 Effectivity: HLX Step 3.1, Rev. 1.1 |
| EC635 T3H | EC635 T3H Flight Manual, Effectivity: HLX Step 2+, Rev. 20.2 EC635 T3H Flight Manual, Effectivity: HLX Step 3.1, Rev. 20.2 EC635 T3H Flight Manual Supplement 9.1-4 Effectivity: HLX Step 3.1, Rev. 1.1 |
| MBB-BK117 D-2 | BK117 D-2 FLM HLX 2, Rev. 25.2 |
| MBB-BK117 D-2m | BK117 D-2 FLM HLX 2, Rev. 16.2 |
| MBB-BK117 D-3 | BK117 D-3 FLM, Rev. 14.1 |
| MBB-BK117 D-3m | BK117 D-3m FLM, Rev. 12.1 |
| [DELETED] | [DELETED] |
| [DELETED] | [DELETED] |

Ref. Publications:



AH ASB EC135H-05A-001 original issue dated 07 July 2022.

AH ASB MBB-BK117 D-2-05A-003 original issue dated 07 July 2022.

AH ASB MBB-BK117 D-3-05A-001 original issue dated 07 July 2022.

[DELETED]

The use of later approved revisions of the above-mentioned documents is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.

Remarks:

1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD.
2. Based on the required actions and the compliance time, the original issue of this AD was posted on 12 August 2022 as a Final AD with Request for Comments, postponing the public consultation process until after its publication.
3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the EASA Safety Information Section, Certification Directorate. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu.
4. Information about any failures, malfunctions, defects or other occurrences, which may be similar to the unsafe condition addressed by this AD, and which may occur, or have occurred on a product, part or appliance not affected by this AD, can be reported to the [EU aviation safety reporting system](#). This may include reporting on the same or similar components, other than those covered by the design to which this AD applies, if the same unsafe condition can exist or may develop on an aircraft with those components installed. Such components may be installed under an FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) or other modification.
5. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this AD, please contact: Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH, Industriestrasse 4, 86609 Donauwörth, Federal Republic of Germany, Telephone: + 33 (0)4 42 85 97 97 or, Web portal: <https://airbusworld.helicopters.airbus.com>; E-mail: customersupport.helicopters@airbus.com, or Airbus Helicopters (Technical Support), Telephone +33 (0)4 42 85 97 89 or, Web portal: <https://airbusworld.helicopters.airbus.com> ; E-mail: TechnicalSupport.Helicopters@airbus.com.



Appendix 1 – RFM Emergency Procedure

REVISED




MBB-BK117 (all models / variants)

Loss of all MFD

Page 1/2

Conditions/Indications

- MFDs:



- MFD FAILURE displayed on all MFDs
- If autopilot upper modes were coupled, they may decouple after 10 seconds (indicated by an „autopilot decouple“ voice message).

Procedure

● ON GROUND

1. Double engine emergency shutdown - Perform

● IN FLIGHT

1. Aircraft trajectory - Maintain using IESI and stand-by compass.
- Use AFCS “recovery” or “go-around” modes, if desired
- Operate aircraft within the approved performance
2. MFD2 pb - OFF

CAUTION IF THE MFD IS RESTARTED AT NIGHT, THE MFD WILL REBOOT WITH FULL BRIGHTNESS AND MAY DISTURB THE PILOT BRIEFLY. RESTARTING AN MFD DURING CRITICAL FLIGHT PHASES SHALL BE AVOIDED.

3. MFD2 pb - ON

If MFD2 restarts (all functions linked to MFD are recovered):

4. MFD2 - Maintain in FND format
5. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

- NOTE**
- For HTAWS to be available, SVS must be switched off (select FDS). After restarting MFD2, it takes 2 minutes before HTAWS is available.
 - TCAS alerts are lost.
 - Weather radar RDR2000 is lost; weather radar RDR1600 remains operational.



MBB-BK117 (all models / variants)**Loss of all MFD****Page 2/2**

If MFD2 does not restart (all MFDs remain off):

4. VMC conditions – Establish

5. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

NOTE ● GPS navigation information can be obtained from the FMS.

- The following AFCS functions are available:

- Basic stabilization (attitude hold)
- AFCS “recovery” (double forward press on the AP/BKUP ON pb on the cyclic) will engage ALT, IAS, HDG/TRK modes on the current values. After engagement, individual upper modes can be disengaged through the APCP or AP UM OFF pb on cyclic grip.
- Go-around mode will be available through the GA pb on the collective. This will engage V/S or FPA and IAS.
- The AFCS status (engaged upper modes IAS, ALT, V/S, FPA, HDG, TRK) is visible on the APCP.
- It is not possible to engage upper modes through the APCP.
- It is not possible to change the upper mode references through the cyclic/collective beep or rotary knob on APCP.

- All vehicle related aural alerts (tones and voice message) remain available.
- HTAWS and TCAS aural alerts are lost.
- Transponder Mode C (altitude reporting) is lost.
- Warning unit is still operating.

REV




EC 135 / EC635 (all models / variants)

Loss of all MFD

Page 1/2

Conditions/Indications

- MFDs:



BAC2_FUJ-0400_R

- MFD FAILURE displayed on all MFDs
- If autopilot upper modes were coupled, they may decouple after 10 seconds (indicated by an „autopilot decouple“ voice message).

Procedure

● ON GROUND

1. Double engine emergency shutdown - Perform

● IN FLIGHT

1. Aircraft trajectory - Maintain using IESI and stand-by compass.
- Use AFCS "recovery" or "go-around" modes, if desired
- Operate aircraft within the approved performance
2. MFD2 pb - OFF

CAUTION IF THE MFD IS RESTARTED AT NIGHT, THE MFD WILL REBOOT WITH FULL BRIGHTNESS AND MAY DISTURB THE PILOT BRIEFLY. RESTARTING AN MFD DURING CRITICAL FLIGHT PHASES SHALL BE AVOIDED.

3. MFD2 pb - ON

If MFD2 restarts (all functions linked to MFD are recovered):

4. MFD2 - Maintain in FND format
5. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

NOTE ● For HTAWS to be available, SVS must be switched off (select FDS). After restarting MFD2, it takes 2 minutes before HTAWS is available.

- TCAS alerts are lost.
- Weather radar RDR2000 is lost; weather radar RDR1600 remains operational.



EC 135 / EC635 (all models / variants)**Loss of all MFD****Page 2/2**

If MFD2 does not restart (all MFDs remain off):

4. VMC conditions – Establish
5. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

NOTE ● GPS navigation information can be obtained from the FMS.

- The following AFCS functions are available:
 - Basic stabilization (attitude hold)
 - AFCS "recovery" (double forward press on the AP/BKUP ON pb on the cyclic) will engage ALT, IAS, HDG/TRK modes on the current values. After engagement, individual upper modes can be disengaged through the APCP or AP UM OFF pb on cyclic grip.
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REV

