



Notification of a Proposal to issue an Airworthiness Directive

PAD No.: 21-048

Issued: 25 March 2021

Note: This Proposed Airworthiness Directive (PAD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 on behalf of the European Union, its Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 129 of that Regulation.

In accordance with the EASA Continuing Airworthiness Procedures, the Executive Director is proposing the issuance/cancellation of an EASA Airworthiness Directive (AD), applicable to the aeronautical product(s) identified below.

All interested persons may send their comments, referencing the PAD Number above, to the e-mail address specified in the 'Remarks' section, prior to the consultation date indicated.

Design Approval Holder's Name:

AIRBUS HELICOPTERS DEUTSCHLAND GmbH

Type/Model designation(s):

MBB-BK117 D-2 helicopters

Effective Date: [TBD - standard: 14 days after AD issue date]

TCDS Number(s): EASA.R.010

Foreign AD: Not applicable

Supersedure: This AD supersedes EASA AD 2018-0163 dated 25 July 2018.

ATA 67 – Rotors Flight Control – Co-pilot Collective Lever Wire Harness – Inspection / Modification

Manufacturer(s):

Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (AHD), formerly Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH

Applicability:

MBB-BK117 D-2 helicopters, all serial numbers up to 20340 inclusive.

Definitions:

For the purpose of this AD, the following definitions apply:

The ASB: Airbus Helicopters (AH) Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) MBB-BK117 D-2-67A-007 Revision 1.

Reason:

An occurrence was reported on a helicopter, where chafing marks were found on the wire harness of the co-pilot collective lever. Investigation results determined that the damage had been caused by incorrect routing of the wire harness.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to a short circuit of one or more electrical cables, possibly resulting in uncommanded activation of systems such as hoist cable cut.



To address this potential unsafe condition, AH issued ASB MBB-BK117 D-2-67A-007, providing inspection instructions, and EASA issued AD 2018-0163, to require a one-time inspection of the co-pilot collective lever wire harness and routing and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s). That AD also required inspection of the wire harness routing, each time a co-pilot collective lever is installed or reinstalled.

Since that AD was issued, AHD designed an improved support for the harness of the co-pilot collective lever, aimed at preventing incorrect routing, and issued the ASB, as defined in this AD, providing modification instructions.

For the reason described above, this AD retains the requirements of EASA AD 2018-0163, which is superseded, reduces the Applicability by excluding helicopters on which this modification is embodied on the production line, and additionally requires replacing the co-pilot collective lever wiring harness support.

Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):

Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:

Initial Inspection:

- (1) Within the compliance time as identified in Table 1 of this AD, as applicable, inspect the wire harness of the co-pilot collective lever and its routing in accordance with the instructions of sections 3.B.2 and 3.B.3 of the ASB.

Table 1 – Co-pilot Collective Lever Wire Harness and Routing Inspection

Helicopter Configuration		Compliance Time
Co-pilot Collective Lever	Rescue Hoist System	
Installed	Installed	Within 100 flight hours (FH) or 3 months, whichever occurs first after 08 August 2018 [the effective date of EASA AD 2018-0163]
Installed	Not installed	Within 12 months after 08 August 2018 [the effective date of EASA AD 2018-0163]
Not installed	Not applicable	During next (re)installation of the co-pilot collective lever after 08 August 2018 [the effective date of EASA AD 2018-0163]

Post-Installation Inspections:

- (2) From 08 August 2018 [the effective date of EASA AD 2018-0163], unless already done as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, before next flight after each (re)installation of the co-pilot collective lever, inspect the co-pilot collective lever wire harness routing in accordance with the instructions of section 3.B.3 of the ASB.



Corrective Action(s):

- (3) If, during any inspection as required by paragraph (1) or (2) of this AD, as applicable, any discrepancy is found, before next flight, accomplish the applicable corrective action(s) in accordance with the instructions of section 3.B.2 and/or 3.B.3, as applicable, of the ASB.

Credit:

- (4) Inspections and corrective action(s) on a helicopter, accomplished before the effective date of this AD in accordance with the instructions of AH ASB MBB-BK117 D-2-67A-007 at original issue, are acceptable to comply with the initial requirements of paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of this AD, as applicable, for that helicopter.

Modification:

- (5) Within 880 FH or 38 months, whichever occurs first after the effective date of this AD, modify the helicopter in accordance with the instructions of section 3.B.4 of the ASB.

Terminating Action:

- (6) Modification of a helicopter as required by paragraph (5) of this AD constitutes terminating action for the post-installation inspections as required by paragraph (2) of this AD for that helicopter.

Ref. Publications:

AH ASB MBB-BK117 D-2-67A-007 original issue dated 23 July 2018, and Revision 1 dated 23 March 2021.

The use of later approved revisions of the above-mentioned document is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.

Remarks:

1. This Proposed AD will be closed for consultation on 22 April 2021.
2. Enquiries regarding this PAD should be referred to the EASA Safety Information Section, Certification Directorate. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu.
3. Information about any failures, malfunctions, defects or other occurrences, which may be similar to the unsafe condition addressed by this PAD, and which may occur, or have occurred on a product, part or appliance not affected by this PAD, can be reported to the [EU aviation safety reporting system](#). This may include reporting on the same or similar components, other than those covered by the design to which this PAD applies, if the same unsafe condition can exist or may develop on an aircraft with those components installed. Such components may be installed under an FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) or other modification.
4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this PAD, please contact: Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH, Industriestrasse 4, 86609 Donauwörth, Federal Republic of Germany, Telephone: + 33 (0)4 42 85 97 97;
Web portal: <https://keycopter.airbushelicopters.com> > Technical Request Management
E-mail: customersupport.helicopters@airbus.com.

