



# Notification of a Proposal to issue an Airworthiness Directive

**PAD No.: 23-106**

**Issued: 04 October 2023**

Note: This Proposed Airworthiness Directive (PAD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 on behalf of the European Union, its Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 129 of that Regulation.

In accordance with the EASA Continuing Airworthiness Procedures, the Executive Director is proposing the issuance of an EASA Airworthiness Directive (AD), applicable to the aeronautical product(s) identified below.

All interested persons may send their comments, referencing the PAD Number above, to the e-mail address specified in the 'Remarks' section, prior to the consultation date indicated.

## Design Approval Holder's Name:

THEO SCHROEDER FIRE BALLOONS GmbH

## Type/Model designation(s):

FB6 Double Burner Assembly

**Effective Date:** [TBD - standard: 14 days after AD issue date]

**Foreign AD:** Not applicable

**Supersedure:** None

## ATA – Hot Air Balloon Burner Assembly and Hanger – Inspection / Modification

### Manufacturer:

Theo Schroeder fire balloons GmbH (Schroeder).

### Applicability:

FB6 double burner assemblies with hydraulic height adjustment, all serial numbers (S/N). These are known to be eligible for installation on any balloon type, and can either be installed during the balloon manufacturing process, or by in-service balloon modification (configuration change).

### Definitions:

For the purpose of this AD, the following definitions apply:

**Affected part:** Connector of FB6 double burner hanger, except a Serviceable part. See Appendix 1 to this AD.

**Serviceable part:** Any connector of FB6 double burner hanger, marked by Schroeder with a stamp "23", or which passed an inspection and has been marked in accordance with instructions of the TN.

**The TN:** Schroeder Technical Note (TN) EASA.BA.016-70.



**Reason:**

An occurrence was reported of a burner type FB6 S/N 2.1239-1 where the connector between the burners was found detached during transportation, leaving one burner unit detached from the load frame. Investigation revealed that the welding process may have been improperly done, due to an insufficiently detailed description of that process in production. The suspected direct cause of failure is fatigue cracking of the weld, mainly due to improper handling during transportation.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to in-flight burner detachment, possibly resulting in injury to balloon occupants. It could also lead to an uncontrolled (cold) descent and hard landing, possibly resulting in injury to balloon occupants and/or persons on the ground.

To address this potential unsafe condition, Schroeder issued the TN, providing inspection and replacement instructions.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-time inspection of each affected part and, depending on findings, replacement with a serviceable part; this AD also prohibits (re)installation of an affected part on any balloon.

**Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):**

Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:

**Inspection(s):**

- (1) Within 12 months or 100 flight hours (FH), whichever occurs first after the effective date of this AD, accomplish an inspection of the weld of each affected part, installed on a balloon, in accordance with the instructions of the TN.

**Corrective Action(s):**

- (2) If, during the inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, any crack is detected or evidence of a weld with insufficient filler material is found, before next flight, replace the affected part with a serviceable part, in accordance with the instructions of the TN.

**Re-identification:**

- (3) If, during the inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, sufficient filler material, as defined in the TN, is found on an affected part, before next flight mark that part in accordance with the instructions of the TN.

**Part(s) Installation:**

- (4) From the effective date of this AD, do not install an affected part or burner assembly having the affected part installed on any balloon.

**Ref. Publications:**

Schroeder TN EASA.BA.016-70, Revision 2 dated 27 September 2023.

The use of later approved revisions of the above-mentioned document is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.



**Remarks:**

1. This Proposed AD will be closed for consultation on 01 November 2023.
2. Enquiries regarding this PAD should be referred to the EASA Safety Information Section, Certification Directorate. E-mail: [ADs@easa.europa.eu](mailto:ADs@easa.europa.eu).
3. Information about any failures, malfunctions, defects or other occurrences, which may be similar to the unsafe condition addressed by this PAD, and which may occur, or have occurred on a product, part or appliance not affected by this PAD, can be reported to the [EU aviation safety reporting system](#). This may include reporting on the same or similar components, other than those covered by the design to which this PAD applies, if the same unsafe condition can exist or may develop on an aircraft with those components installed. Such components may be installed under an FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) or other modification.
4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this PAD, please contact: Theo Schroeder fire balloons GmbH, Gewerbegebiet Am Bahnhof 12, 54338, Schweich, Bundesrepublik Deutschland. E-mail: [plein@schroederballon.de](mailto:plein@schroederballon.de), Website: <http://www.schroederballon.de>.



## Appendix 1




Figure 1 – Affected Part

