

COMMENT RESPONSE DOCUMENT

EASA PAD No. 24-006

[Published on 19 January 2024 and officially closed for comments on 16 February 2024]

Commenter 1: A Garside – 12/02/2024

Comment # 1

A) This PAD is referring to an issue reported 20 years ago of two instances of a canopy opening in flight, and in one of those incidents it could not be confirmed that the canopy was in fact correctly locked.

The PAD does not suggest any evidence either from Schempp-Hirth or EASA of any further incidents over the past 20 years. What is the reasoning to now change this from a TN to an AD?

B) Before this PAD becomes an AD the TNs referred to, issued 20 years ago, should be either updated or new ones issued. The part numbers quoted in the TNs are no longer valid, for example the Magnet 37513 Magma-C and the Hose clamp S9/9ZY VPE 100 (Norma).

EASA response:

1A) Comment agreed. The Reason paragraph of the final AD has been amended to provide more details.

1B) Comment noted: Schempp-Hirth confirmed that the part numbers specified in the TNs are valid, clarified that “VPE 100’ refers to the packaging unit of 100 pieces per order”, and confirmed a typo in the magnet definition (“Magma” instead of “Magna”). No changes have been made to the Final AD in response to this comment.

Commenter 2: Kasper Pasma – 18/02/2024

Comment # 2

We operate a Nimbus 4DT for 10 years now performing winch and aero tow launches.

1. *The handle in locked position but not connected with the fuselage pins* has happened. But is clearly visible for the pilots in both seats and can easily be corrected in the pre-flight checks by a visual check and by pushing the canopy upwards. This is common in gliders. In the DG800 the pin is behind



the head of the pilot and the error can only be detected by pressing the canopy upwards. In our opinion this does not require a modification of the locking mechanism.

2. We both perform aero tow and winch launches and have never observed the locking mechanism to move into the open position by e.g. deformation.

EASA response:

Comment noted. Risk assessment, which triggered issuance of the Technical Notes and recent decision to mandate them by AD, is based on collection of data from many operators, many aircraft, in long time perspective, what allowed to identify existence of the unsafe condition.

No changes have been made to the Final AD in response to this comment.

