

## COMMENT RESPONSE DOCUMENT

EASA PAD No. 24-062

[Published on 31 May 2024 and officially closed for comments on 28 June 2024]

### *Commenter 1: Canadian North – Graham Wilson – 06/06/2024*

#### Comment # 1

Regarding PAD No. 24-062, Canadian North kindly requests consideration of a change to paragraph (2) regarding the part(s) installation prohibition. Due to worldwide supply chain issues with aviation parts, it is foreseeable that a shortage of Thales probes C16363AA could be a possibility and impose an AOG situation for operators.

It is noted in paragraph (1) of the PAD, that the affected part 0861GP, can remain installed for 24 months after the effective date of the AD.

We request that the language in paragraph (2) be changed to align with paragraph (1) to allow the affected part 0861GP to be installed for up to 24 months after the effective date of the AD.”

#### *EASA response:*

***Comment # 1 not agreed. The risk assessment does not foresee the installation of an affected part, even for a limited period of time and within the time frame set in paragraph (1) of the AD.***

***However, the removal of an affected part from an aeroplane and subsequent reinstallation of that affected part on the same aeroplane, accomplished during a single maintenance visit, is not considered as ‘install’. The paragraph 2 of the final AD has been modified accordingly.***

### *Commenter 2: Collins Aerospace – Michael Daup – 27/06/2024*

#### Comment # 2

Collins Aerospace requests the attached updates to PAD 24-062. Please let us know if you have any questions or concerns:

Collins Aerospace requests the following edits to PAD 24-062 and referenced documents:



**EASA Notification of a Proposal to issue an Airworthiness Directive****PAD No.: 24-062****REASON**

During an acceptance flight of an aeroplane fitted with an affected part, an issue has been identified on the stall warning system. Further investigation highlighted *Stall Warning System performance at low airspeeds, which could lead to a delayed activation of stick pusher in flaps extended configuration. This condition, if not corrected, in combination with flight at high angle of attack, could lead to non-activation of the stick pusher and ultimately to a loss of control of the aeroplane.*

*To address this potential unsafe condition, ATR issued the AOM (which refers to the applicable SB) to provide instructions for modification of the stall warning system.*

*For the reason described above, this AD requires replacement of component(s) of the stall warning system with serviceable parts. This AD also prohibits (re)installation of affected components.*

**EASA response:**

***Comment # 2 not agreed. Suggested wording does not improve AD readability and does not follow EASA AD standard wording. No changes have been made to the final AD in response to this comment.***

