



# Notification of a Proposal to issue an Airworthiness Directive

**PAD No.:** 26-038

**Issued:** 24 March 2026

Note: This Proposed Airworthiness Directive (PAD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 on behalf of the European Union, its Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 129 of that Regulation.

In accordance with the EASA Continuing Airworthiness Procedures, the Executive Director is proposing the issuance of an EASA Airworthiness Directive (AD), applicable to the aeronautical product(s) identified below.

All interested persons may send their comments, referencing the PAD Number above, to the e-mail address specified in the 'Remarks' section, prior to the consultation date indicated.

**Design Approval Holder's Name:** **Type/Model designation(s):**

AIRBUS HELICOPTERS DEUTSCHLAND GmbH MBB-BK117 helicopters

**Effective Date:** [TBD - standard: 14 days after AD issue date]

**TCDS Number(s):** EASA.R.010

**Foreign AD:** Not applicable

**Supersedure:** None

## ATA – Rotorcraft Flight Manual – Section Emergency Procedures – Amendment

## ATA 42 – Integrated Modular Avionics – Ethernet Network – Inspection / Modification

### Manufacturer(s):

Airbus Helicopters (AH); Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH; Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd.; and Airbus Helicopters Inc.

### Applicability:

MBB-BK117 D-2, except the D-2m variant, and MBB-BK117 D-3 helicopters, serial number (s/n) 20001 to 20360 (inclusive) and s/n 21001 to 21999 (inclusive).

### Definitions:

For the purpose of this AD, the following definitions apply:

**The ASB:** AH Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) MBB-BK117 D-2-05A-003 or ASB MBB-BK117 D-3-05A-001, as applicable.

**The software SB:** AH Service Bulletin (SB) MBB-BK117-46-00-0002 or SB MBB-BK117-46-00-0003, as applicable.



**The modification ASB:** AH ASB MBB-BK117-42-00-0001 Issue 003 or ASB MBB-BK117-42-00-0003, as applicable.

**Maintenance mode test procedure:** In accordance with the instructions of the section 'Accomplishment Procedure – 3.B.1' of the ASB.

**Operational mode test procedure:** In accordance with the instructions of the section 'Accomplishment Procedure – 3.B.3' of the ASB.

**Troubleshooting instructions:** In accordance with the instructions of the sections 'Accomplishment Procedure – 3.B.2' and 'Accomplishment Procedure – 3.B.4' of the ASB.

**Operational limitation:** Prohibition to operate the helicopter in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) and Night Visual Meteorological Conditions (Night VMC); and installation of a placard in the cockpit in accordance with the instructions of the ASB.

**The RFM Emergency Procedure:** Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) emergency procedure as identified in Appendix 1 of this AD.

#### Reason:

Occurrences were reported of multiple multi-function display (MFD) failures. Investigations identified design deficiencies in the Helionix Ethernet network management of the Integrated Modular Avionics suite (IMA), which caused MFD failures due to certain damage to Ethernet wiring or connections to avionics equipment.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to reduced situational awareness of the pilot, possibly resulting in reduced control of the helicopter.

To address this potential unsafe condition, AH issued the ASB, as defined in this AD, providing instructions for inspection, and EASA issued AD 2022-0143 to require repetitive checks of the functional status of the IMA Ethernet network and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s), which may include an operational limitation.

After that AD was issued, AH developed an emergency procedure, to be applied in case of multiple MFD failures or loss of all MFDs, and issued a Temporary Revision of the RFM, incorporating this emergency procedure. Consequently, EASA issued AD 2022-0168, retaining the requirements of EASA AD 2022-0143, which was superseded, additionally requiring incorporation of the RFM Emergency Procedure, as defined in this AD, into the applicable RFM.

Since that AD was issued, AH developed modifications for MBB-BK117 D-2 (except for the D-2m variant) and MBB-BK117 D-3 helicopters to address the previously identified deficiencies in the design of the Helionix avionics suite, and issued the software SB and the modification ASB, as both defined in this AD. These (A)SBs provide instructions to install HELIONIX V10 or V10.1, as applicable, and for modification of the software of the Helionix Aircraft Management Computers (AMCs) and MFDs.



For the reasons described above, this AD takes over the requirements for MBB-BK117 D-2, except the D-2m variant, and MBB-BK117 D-3 helicopters from EASA AD 2022-0168 (later revised), requiring in addition modification of all affected MBB-BK117 D-2, except the D-2m variant, and MBB-BK117 D-3 helicopters; this modification constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspection as required by AD 2022-0168 (later revised), for those helicopters.

Concurrently with the issuance of this AD, EASA AD 2022-0168R2 is revised to remove MBB-BK117 D-2, except the D-2m variant, and MBB-BK117 D-3 helicopters from its applicability.

#### **Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):**

Required as indicated by this AD, unless the action(s) required by this AD have been already accomplished:

#### **Restatement of the requirements of EASA AD 2022-0168**

##### **Inspection(s):**

- (1) Within 55 flight hours (FH) after 15 July 2022 [the effective date of EASA AD 2022-0143], and, thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 110 FH, accomplish a check in accordance with the maintenance mode test procedure, and in accordance with the operational mode test procedure, as both defined in this AD.

##### **Corrective Action(s):**

- (2) If, during any check as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, any discrepancy, as identified in the ASB, is detected, before next flight, accomplish the applicable corrective action(s) in accordance with the troubleshooting instructions, as defined in this AD.

##### **Additional Maintenance Requirements:**

- (3) From 15 July 2022 [the effective date of EASA AD 2022-0143], following accomplishment on a helicopter of any maintenance task that includes disconnection and subsequent re-connection of any connector of the IMA Helionix Ethernet network, or following any MFD failure, before next flight, accomplish a check in accordance with the maintenance mode test procedure, and in accordance with the operational mode test procedure, and, depending on findings, accomplish the applicable corrective action(s) in accordance with the troubleshooting instructions.

##### **Operational Limitation:**

- (4) If, after accomplishment of the troubleshooting instructions as required by paragraph (2) or (3) of this AD, as applicable, any discrepancy cannot be removed or corrected, before next flight, implement the operational limitation, as defined in this AD, inform all flight crews and, thereafter, operate the helicopter accordingly.

##### **Alternative Method:**

- (5) Implementing on a helicopter the operational limitation as specified in paragraph (4) of this AD is an acceptable alternative method to defer compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this AD, as applicable, for that helicopter. Following accomplishment of the checks and corrective action(s), as applicable, as required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this AD, the operational limitation can be removed, provided any discrepancy has been removed or corrected, as applicable.



**Terminating Action(s):**

- (6) Accomplishment on a helicopter of the corrective action(s) as required by paragraph (2) of this AD does not constitute terminating action for the repetitive inspections as required by paragraph (1) of this AD for that helicopter.

**RFM Amendment:**

- (7) Within 7 days after 26 August 2022 [the effective date of EASA AD 2022-0168 at original issue], amend the RFM by incorporating the RFM Emergency Procedure, inform all flight crews and, thereafter, operate the helicopter accordingly.
- (8) Amending the applicable RFM of a helicopter by incorporating the RFM revision as specified in Table 1 of this AD, as applicable, or a later approved RFM revision, which includes the same content as the RFM Emergency Procedure, as applicable, is an acceptable method to comply with the requirements of paragraph (7) of this AD for that helicopter.

Table 1 – RFM revisions

RFM Revision
MBB-BK117 D-2, except the D-2m variant: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BK117 D-2 FLM HLX 2, Revision 25.2</li> </ul> MBB-BK117 D-3: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BK117 D-3 FLM, Revision 14.1</li> </ul>

**New requirements of this AD****HELIONIX Modification:**

- (9) Within 29 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the helicopter in accordance with the instructions of the 'Accomplishment Procedure' of the software SB and of the modification ASB (see Note 1 of this AD).

Note 1: The modification of a helicopter as required by paragraph (9) of this AD requires concurrent accomplishment of the software SB and the modification ASB.

- (10) Prior to or concurrently with the modification as required by paragraph (9) of this AD, modify the helicopter in accordance with the instructions of the software SB Section 4.1, 'Concurrent Requirements – Modification(s) that must be performed first', as applicable to helicopter model and depending on helicopter configuration.

**Credit:**

- (11) Modification of a helicopter, accomplished before the effective date of this AD in accordance with the instructions of AH SB MBB-BK117-42-00-0001 at Issue 001 or Issue 002, is acceptable to comply with the requirements of paragraph (9) of this AD for that helicopter.



**RFM Amendment:**

- (12) After modification of a helicopter as required by paragraph (9) of this AD, that helicopter must be operated in accordance with the RFM revision specified in Table 2 of this AD, including the supplements for special operations and optional equipment, as applicable to helicopter model and depending on helicopter configuration, and all flight crews must be informed accordingly.

Table 2 – RFM revisions

RFM Revision
MBB-BK117 D-2, except the D-2m variant: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FLM BK117 D-2 HELIONIX SW V10</li> </ul> MBB-BK117 D-3: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FLM BK117 D-3 HELIONIX SW V10</li> </ul>

- (13) After modification of a helicopter as required by paragraph (9) of this AD, the requirements of paragraph (12) of this AD supersede the requirements of paragraph (7) of this AD for that helicopter.

**Terminating Action(s):**

- (14) Modification of a helicopter as required by paragraphs (9) of this AD constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections as required by paragraph (1) of this AD and cancels the requirements of paragraph (3) and (4) of this AD, as applicable, for that helicopter.

**Ref. Publications:**

AH ASB MBB-BK117 D-2-05A-003 original issue dated 07 July 2022.

AH ASB MBB-BK117 D-3-05A-001 original issue dated 07 July 2022.

AH SB MBB-BK117-46-00-0002 original issue (Issue 001) dated 11 November 2024.

AH SB MBB-BK117-46-00-0003 original issue (Issue 001) dated 07 March 2025.

AH SB MBB-BK117-42-00-0001 original issue (Issue 001) dated 11 November 2024, or Issue 002 dated 07 March 2025, or Issue 003 (ASB) dated 08 January 2026.

AH ASB MBB-BK117-42-00-0003 original issue (Issue 001) dated 08 January 2026.

The use of later approved revisions of the above-mentioned documents is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.

**Remarks:**

1. This Proposed AD will be closed for consultation on 21 April 2026.



2. Enquiries regarding this PAD should be referred to the EASA Safety Information Section, Certification Directorate. E-mail: [ADs@easa.europa.eu](mailto:ADs@easa.europa.eu).
3. Information about any failures, malfunctions, defects or other occurrences, which may be similar to the unsafe condition addressed by this PAD, and which may occur, or have occurred on a product, part or appliance not affected by this PAD, can be reported to the [EU aviation safety reporting system](#). This may include reporting on the same or similar components, other than those covered by the design to which this PAD applies, if the same unsafe condition can exist or may develop on an aircraft with those components installed. Such components may be installed under an FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) or other modification.
4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this PAD, please contact: Airbus Helicopters (Technical Support) at:  
Web portal: <https://airbusworld.helicopters.airbus.com> / Technical Requests Management, or  
E-mail: [TechnicalSupport.Helicopters@airbus.com](mailto:TechnicalSupport.Helicopters@airbus.com), or Telephone: +33 (0)4 42 859 789.



## Appendix 1 – RFM Emergency Procedure




## MBB-BK117 (all models / variants)

## Loss of all MFD

Page 1/2

## Conditions/Indications

- MFDs:



- MFD FAILURE displayed on all MFDs
- If autopilot upper modes were coupled, they may decouple after 10 seconds (indicated by an „autopilot decouple“ voice message).

## Procedure

## ● ON GROUND

1. Double engine emergency shutdown - Perform

## ● IN FLIGHT

1. Aircraft trajectory - Maintain using IESI and stand-by compass.  
- Use AFCS “recovery” or “go-around” modes, if desired  
- Operate aircraft within the approved performance
2. MFD2 pb - OFF

**CAUTION** IF THE MFD IS RESTARTED AT NIGHT, THE MFD WILL REBOOT WITH FULL BRIGHTNESS AND MAY DISTURB THE PILOT BRIEFLY. RESTARTING AN MFD DURING CRITICAL FLIGHT PHASES SHALL BE AVOIDED.

3. MFD2 pb - ON

If MFD2 restarts (all functions linked to MFD are recovered):

4. MFD2 - Maintain in FND format
5. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

- NOTE**
- For HTAWS to be available, SVS must be switched off (select FDS). After restarting MFD2, it takes 2 minutes before HTAWS is available.
  - TCAS alerts are lost.
  - Weather radar RDR2000 is lost; weather radar RDR1600 remains operational.





**MBB-BK117 (all models / variants)****Loss of all MFD****Page 2/2**

If MFD2 does not restart (all MFDs remain off):

4. VMC conditions – Establish

5. LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE

NOTE ● GPS navigation information can be obtained from the FMS.

- The following AFCS functions are available:
  - Basic stabilization (attitude hold)
  - AFCS "recovery" (double forward press on the AP/BKUP ON pb on the cyclic) will engage ALT, IAS, HDG/TRK modes on the current values. After engagement, individual upper modes can be disengaged through the APCP or AP UM OFF pb on cyclic grip.
  - Go-around mode will be available through the GA pb on the collective. This will engage V/S or FPA and IAS.
  - The AFCS status (engaged upper modes IAS, ALT, V/S, FPA, HDG, TRK) is visible on the APCP.
  - It is not possible to engage upper modes through the APCP.
  - It is not possible to change the upper mode references through the cyclic/collective beep or rotary knob on APCP.
- All vehicle related aural alerts (tones and voice message) remain available.
- HTAWS and TCAS aural alerts are lost.
- Transponder Mode C (altitude reporting) is lost.
- Warning unit is still operating.

