



Nr. **NL-2006-010**

Distribution : **L**

Date : July 14, 2006

Type Certificate Holder :

FOKKER SERVICES B.V.

(formerly Fokker Aircraft B.V.)

F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100

EASA Type Certificate Nr.

A.037

Caution

This Airworthiness Directive is issued by the Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management in accordance with the Aviation Act 2001 (Wet Luchtvaart), Article 3.22. Airworthiness Directives affect aviation safety. These are regulations which require immediate attention. No person may operate an aircraft to which an Airworthiness Directive applies, except in accordance with the requirements thereof, unless otherwise agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry (EC2042/2003, M.A.201 & M.A.303).

THIS AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE IS PUBLISHED BY THE CAA-NL :

- acting for and on behalf of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), as Airworthiness Authority (ICAO Annex 8) of the State of Design for the affected product(s) with reference to 21A.3B (a) and (b); and
- has been approved under EASA reference Number 2006-0195 dated July 7, 2006.

Supersedure : Not Applicable

Subject : AUTO FLIGHT - AUTOPILOT DISCONNECT UNIT - INSTALLATION

Applicability : Fokker Aircraft B.V. Model F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 aircraft, all serial numbers

Reason : To date, there have been at least 10 reported events on Fokker 70 (F28 Mark 0070) and Fokker 100 (F28 Mark 0100) aircraft where the flight crew manually overpowered the autopilot, inadvertently neglecting to disengage the autopilot. Detailed investigation of these incidents has shown that this usually occurs in a high workload environment that demands immediate manual control of the aircraft by the pilot flying, e.g. terrain warning. When the autopilot is not disengaged, the elevator servomotor is overpowered and the horizontal stabilizer is moved by the Automatic Flight Control & Augmentation System (AFCAS) auto-trim in a direction opposite to the (manual) deflection of the elevator, causing high elevator control forces. This condition, if not corrected, could cause the stabilizer to move to an extreme out-of-trim position, creating the (remote) possibility of loss of control of the aircraft, due to the extreme control loads. In the original design of AFCAS, operation of the control wheel-mounted stabilizer trim switches has no effect when the autopilot is engaged. Based on the assumption that stabilizer trim switches will be operated by the pilot flying when encountering high control forces, an Autopilot Disconnect Unit has been developed that disconnects the autopilot when the stabilizer trim switches are operated. Since a potentially unsafe condition has been identified that may exist or develop on aircraft of this type design, this Airworthiness Directive requires the installation of Autopilot Disconnect Units and associated wiring changes.

Effective date : August 1, 2006

Mandatory Actions and Compliance Times : Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

Within the next 36 calendar months after the effective date of this directive, modify the aircraft in accordance with Section 3 Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-22-050 dated April 25, 2006 or a later EASA-approved revision.

Reference Publication(s) :

Fokker Services SBF100-22-050

Remarks :

- Operators of the affected aircraft may obtain copies of the referenced service information upon request directly from **Fokker Services B.V., Technical Services Dept., P.O.Box 231, 2150 AE Nieuw-Vennep, The Netherlands;** telephone (31) 252-627-350; facsimile (31) 252-627-211; e-mail technicalservices.fokkerservices@stork.com or can be downloaded from www.myfokkerfleet.com.
- Compliance with this directive must be recorded in the proper Aircraft Log Book(s).

Address inquiries concerning this AD to : Civil Aviation Authority, Aircraft Division, Section C&D, P.O. Box 575, 2130 AN Hoofddorp, The Netherlands; telephone +31-23-566-3155; facsimile +31-23-566-3006; e-mail Info.Register@ivw.nl.