

EASA	AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
	AD No.: 2009-0267 Date: 17 December 2009 Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 on behalf of the European Community, its Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 66 of that Regulation.
This AD is issued in accordance with EC 1702/2003, Part 21A.3B. In accordance with EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the Agency [EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [EC 216/2008, Article 14(4) exemption].	
Type Approval Holder's Name : BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd	Type/Model designation(s) : Jetstream 3100 and 3200 aeroplanes
TCDS Number : EASA.A.191	
Foreign AD : Not applicable	
Supersedure : None	
ATA 27	Flight Controls – Flap Selector Switch Wiring – Modification
Manufacturer(s):	British Aerospace PLC, British Aerospace (Commercial Aircraft) Ltd, British Aerospace Regional Aircraft Ltd, Jetstream Aircraft Ltd and British Aerospace (Operations) Ltd.
Applicability:	Jetstream Series 3100 and 3200 aeroplanes, all models, all serial numbers.
Reason:	BAE Systems have received three reports of uncommanded flap extensions affecting different Jetstream 31 aeroplanes. In one instance, the aeroplane exceeded the airspeed limit allowed for the uncommanded flap configuration, resulting in damage to the wing trailing edge. Following investigation, it was considered that a loss of electrical signal to the 'up' solenoid of the flap selector valve had occurred and, combined with the normal internal leakage in the hydraulic system, resulted in hydraulic pressure being supplied to the 'down' side of the flap hydraulic jack. The loss of signal could have been intermittent, and the evidence strongly implicated oxide debris contamination of the flap selector switch contacts. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to further cases of damage to the aeroplane due to airspeed limit exceedance, possibly resulting in asymmetric flap deployment, which could lead to loss of control of the aeroplane. To address this unsafe condition, BAE Systems have developed a modification for the wiring to the flap selector switch, connecting a different (unused) pair of contacts to provide a duplicated signal path within the switch. For the reasons described above, this AD requires the modification of the flap selector switch wiring.
Effective Date:	31 December 2009

Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):	Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously: Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, install modification JM7861, Introduction of a Wire Link to Flap Selector Switch, in accordance with the instructions of BAE Systems Service Bulletin (SB) 27-JM7861.
Ref. Publications:	BAE Systems (Operations) Limited SB 27-JM7861 dated 12 February 2008. The use of later approved revisions of this document is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.
Remarks :	1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD. 2. This AD was posted on 06 October 2009 as PAD 09-118 for consultation until 31 October 2009. No comments were received during the consultation period. 3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the Airworthiness Directives, Safety Management & Research Section, Certification Directorate, EASA. E-mail ADs@easa.europa.eu. 4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this AD, please contact: BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd, Customer Information Department, Prestwick International Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 2RW, Scotland, United Kingdom; Telephone +44 1292 675207, Facsimile +44 1292 675704; E-mail: RApublications@baesystems.com