


EASA	NOTIFICATION OF A PROPOSAL TO ISSUE AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
	<p>PAD No.: 14-075</p> <p>Date: 28 April 2014</p> <p>Note: This Proposed Airworthiness Directive (PAD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 on behalf of the European Community, its Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 66 of that Regulation.</p>
<p>In accordance with the EASA Continuing Airworthiness Procedures, the Executive Director is proposing the issuance of an EASA Airworthiness Directive (AD), applicable to the aeronautical product(s) identified below. All interested persons may send their comments, referencing the PAD Number above, to the e-mail address specified in the 'Remarks' section, prior to the consultation closing date indicated.</p>	
<p>Design Approval Holder's Name: FOKKER SERVICES B.V.</p>	<p>Type/Model designation(s): F27 aeroplanes</p>
<p>TCDS Number: EASA.A.036</p>	
<p>Foreign AD: Not applicable</p>	
<p>Supersedure: This AD supersedes EASA AD 2013-0027 dated 08 February 2013.</p>	
ATA 28	Fuel – Inboard Fuel Tank Wiring – Modification [Fuel Tank Safety]
Manufacturer(s):	Fokker Aircraft B.V.
Applicability:	F27 Mark 050, Mark 0502 and Mark 0604 aeroplanes, serial numbers 20267 through 20269 inclusive, 20293, 20294, 20295, 20305, 20308, 20311, 20321 and 20327.
Reason:	<p>Prompted by an accident of a Boeing 747-131 (flight TWA800), the FAA published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12.</p> <p>The review conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker 50/60 design in response to these regulations revealed that a wiring failure, external to the inboard fuel tank, causing a hot short circuit to a maximum (max) level sensor wire may result in excessive heating of the max level sensor element.</p> <p>This condition, if not corrected, could create an ignition source in an inboard fuel tank vapour space, possibly resulting in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane.</p> <p>EASA issued AD 2013-0027 to address this unsafe condition, which required installation of three fuses in the wiring of the max level sensor in each inboard fuel tank, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Services Service Bulletin (SB) SBF50-28-036.</p> <p>Since that AD was issued, analysis showed that this technical solution (similar to the one previously applied to Fokker 70/100 aeroplanes per SBF100-28-073)</p>

	<p>can cause fuel spills during refuelling. No actual fuel spills have been reported on Fokker 50/60 aeroplanes.</p> <p>More recently, Fokker Services issued SBF50-28-041, which cancelled SBF50-28-036, to correct the unsafe condition without the risk of fuel spills.</p> <p>For the reasons described above, this AD retains most of the requirements of EASA AD 2013-0027, which is superseded, requires removal of one fuse from post-SBF50-28-036 aeroplanes, and installation of only two fuses on pre-SBF50-28-036 aeroplanes and, subsequently, the implementation of the associated Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation (CDCCL) items.</p> <p>More information on this subject can be found in Fokker Services All Operators Message AOF50.050#06.</p>
Effective Date:	[TBD: 14 days after final AD issue date]
Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):	<p>Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) For aeroplanes in post-SBF50-28-036 configuration: Within 24 months after 22 February 2013 [the effective date of EASA AD 2013-0027], remove one fuse from the wiring of the max level sensor in each inboard fuel tank in accordance with Part 1 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Services SBF50-28-041. (2) For aeroplanes in pre-SBF50-28-036 configuration: Within 24 months after 22 February 2013 [the effective date of EASA AD 2013-0027], install two fuses in the wiring of the max level sensor in each inboard fuel tank in accordance with Part 2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Services SBF50-28-041. (3) Before next flight after modification of an aeroplane as required by paragraph (1) or (2) of this AD, as applicable, accomplish the after installation tests on that aeroplane and, depending on the test results, accomplish all applicable corrective actions in accordance with Part 3 of the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Services SBF50-28-041. (4) CDCCL items: After modification of an aeroplane as required by paragraph (1) or (2) of this AD, as applicable, ensure that the wiring fuses remain installed on that aeroplane in accordance with the information provided in paragraph 1.L.(1)(c) of Fokker Services SBF50-28-041. (5) Compliance with the requirement of paragraph (4) of this AD can be demonstrated by: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (5.1) Revising as follows the approved aircraft maintenance programme on the basis of which the operator or the owner ensures the continuing airworthiness of each operated aeroplane: Incorporate the CDCCL related information provided in paragraph 1.L.(1)(c) of Fokker Services SBF50-28-041, and (5.2) Complying with the approved aircraft maintenance programme described in paragraph (5.1) of this AD.
Ref. Publications:	<p>Fokker Services SBF50-28-041 dated 23 January 2014</p> <p>The use of later approved revision of this document is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.</p>
Remarks:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. This Proposed AD will be closed for consultation on 26 May 2014. 2. Enquiries regarding this PAD should be referred to the Safety Information Section, Executive Directorate, EASA. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu. 3. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in

	<p>this PAD, please contact: Fokker Services B.V., Technical Services Dept., P.O. Box 1357, 2130 EL, Hoofddorp, The Netherlands; telephone +31-88-6280-350; facsimile +31-88-6280-111; e-mail: technicalservices@fokker.com. The referenced publication can be downloaded from www.myfokkerfleet.com.</p>
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